If current trends in sexual politics continue to impose themselves on human society, warlordism as a political system is a genuine possibility.
The idea that, in the future, warlordism may be a common political system is based on the premise that current political systems are increasingly restrictive of the sexual freedom of men.
These restrictive trends are based on female solidarity aimed at protecting the market value of female sexuality in general, and the sexual market value of less attractive women more specifically. Claiming the moral high ground and the alleged protection of the vulnerable, concepts restricting male access to female sexuality find their way into laws and government policies.
Evolutionary theories often suggest that male sexuality leans toward polygamy, as the highest reproductive success for male genes is achieved by fertilizing as many females as possible.
By contrast, evolutionary models suggest female sexuality often favors monogamy, as the highest reproductive success comes from securing a strong male partner for as long as possible to protect and provide for offspring.
The fact that the political systems of Western democracies put a strong emphasis on men conforming to monogamous standards becomes obvious when we observe which “failures” have the greatest impact on the political careers of men in North America or Europe. It is not how they manage the economy, or even how they conduct wars.
It is the degree to which they are monogamous. Recall that one of the most prominent issues during the Clinton presidency was whether or not he had a sexual relationship with Monica Lewinsky.
So, why warlordism?
When loopholes for forms of sexual contact that are not officially approved are closed, or secretive activities become impossible because society—especially its rulers—is under constant observation, any violent social environment becomes an attractive option. In such an environment, control is interrupted, and a sense prevails that anything can happen (including in the realm of sexual conduct). This, then, is perceived as freedom.
Warlordism is the fragmentation of countries and the establishment of zones that are ruled by warlords.
In such fragmented countries where zones are ruled by warlords, the upper classes of warring factions typically enjoy many more liberties than they would in peacetime.
One of the principal errors in current political understanding is the assumption that political rulers ought to, and generally do, exercise their power for the benefit of those they rule.
This is, and always was, a lie.
The primary reason rulers want to rule has always been that ruling benefits the rulers. This is argued to be the natural state of social interactions, and it is hypocritical to profess otherwise.
Over the past centuries of democracy, it was easy for rulers to pretend that they were in office for the benefit of the ruled, when in fact, they ruled for their own sake. Because it was easy to pretend to rule for the sake of the public, those who ruled did not see any necessity to dismantle the public dogma that those who rule ought to do so for the sake of the ruled.
Furthermore, it was useful to pretend to rule for the benefit of the ruled, as, to some degree, it preempted dissent.
However, the transparency that now prevails in human society as a result of digital data processing capabilities negates most of the behind-the-scenes benefits that those who rule were able to enjoy, even in political systems that demand that rulers govern for the benefit of the ruled rather than for their own benefit.
I do not believe that those who rule human societies will ever genuinely do so without expecting substantial benefits for themselves. This would be against human nature.
Therefore, if political systems heavily restrict the benefits that rulers can garner for themselves, men who are potential rulers will consider other political systems, such as warlordism, rather than doing away with the idea that ruling has to benefit rulers.
Rulers and their upper classes have a lot to gain from social chaos, in which they can establish themselves as warlords. This is because during war (even low-intensity conflicts), the upper classes of warring factions are much less under the control of the ruled (whose primary concern is simply not getting hurt or killed).
In the past, rulers would enjoy the most benefits from being rulers during peacetime. They therefore pursued peace.
But in an age where digital data processing establishes a high degree of transparency regarding peacetime rulers, and thus undermines the benefits they can reap as rulers, chaos and low-intensity conflicts become attractive alternatives for rulers and potential rulers.
Alternatively, political systems may develop that afford male rulers genuine benefits for their leadership. These benefits do not have to be material; they could just as well be sexual (for instance, by allowing polygamy, with rulers naturally acquiring the greatest number of wives).
In this theoretical framework, the ultimate compensation for men in human society is not money, nor power for the sake of power, but sexual access and sexual satisfaction.
If this cannot be arranged, then the alternative may be warlordism.