Democracy does not equate to freedom—neither political nor personal freedom.
Democracy merely describes a procedure by which a government is constituted: through a more or less direct vote by a large number of people. The government thus constituted may or may not establish or preserve a high degree of personal freedom for its people.
The Nazi Party rose to power through democratic elections, and Iran holds democratic elections for certain offices. In either case, this neither means that the elected government allowed or allows a high degree of personal freedom, nor that, for that matter, it has been or is beneficial for those who elected it.
In most countries of the world, the average voter is not capable of comprehending which policies will benefit them. And anyway, most people would not vote for policies that would benefit them, even if they could identify them. Rather, people vote for political forces that they believe will be even more detrimental to those they hold grudges against than to themselves.
It is the most basic recipe for populism: play on the resentments of a large number of relatively uneducated people, and they will vote for you. This is the appeal of campaigning on a wave of hatred toward minorities (as the Nazis did in Germany). It is also the appeal of campaigning on a wave of envy toward a country’s upper classes, or on a wave of jealousy toward those who are in a position to enjoy life better than the average voter.
The implementation of direct democracy in poor developing countries often leads to chaos, and sometimes to failed states and civil war. There is seldom legislative efficiency, but when there are legislative stalemates, the most likely laws to be passed anyway are those that target minorities, restrict personal freedom, and satisfy the envy of a large number of people.
Legislation regulating sexual behavior is an example. When the majority of poor people have the final say, the potentially libertine lifestyle of richer people will be criminalized—not so much because it contradicts the religion of the land, but because those who cannot afford it themselves are in no mood to grant it to others. A good number of people who cannot enjoy a libertine lifestyle may even turn to religion, not because of a genuine conviction of its truth, but because certain religions provide a natural home for those who want the worst for those who can enjoy what they themselves cannot. Direct elections may work in the US, where the ethnic origins of the voting population are so diverse and integrated to such a degree that these origins become largely irrelevant. Compared to countries in Africa and Asia, there are few regional or ethnic loyalties in the US. Californians will not necessarily vote for Californians, and Americans of German origin will not vote for candidates simply because they are of German origin. In contrast, in deeply divided societies, Hutus often vote for Hutus, and Tamils for Tamils. There is little crossing of ethnic lines. Furthermore, in Iraq, Shiites vote for Shiites and Sunnis for Sunnis. No matter how you look at it in such countries, direct democracy is a recipe for disintegration. This is because ethnic politicians who exploit ethnic or religious hatred will be elected, rather than those who promote a message of interethnic understanding.
There are alternatives, such as indirect democracies in which relatively small groups of people elect delegates who then elect either legislative and executive leaders, or, even better, who then elect another group of delegates to choose the legislative and executive leaders (a three-tier system).
Neighborhoods can elect delegates who elect city delegates; city delegates then elect legislative delegates, and legislative delegates elect executives. Such a system will strongly reduce the opportunity for populism. In such a system, there is much more incentive to make everything work, and to do so by means of compromise. There is also more incentive to maintain a level of personal freedom that can be enjoyed by those who likely have the means: the delegate class (let this be many thousands; the more, the better).
This form of democracy can be made more sophisticated by integrating delegates from outside political parties—a system Suharto skillfully established in Indonesia to achieve stability for more than 30 years. Delegates in Suharto’s Indonesia were not only from political parties but included traditional ethnic leaders and religious representatives. Why not, in a modern country, have delegates from universities, industry, labor unions, and environmental protection groups?
Even though the Suharto era in Indonesia was a dictatorship, and even though Suharto started out as a general, his power was not based solely on military force. It was based on a sophisticated integration of many segments of society. Suharto’s regime also did not end like Gaddafi’s.
The US has a vital interest in promoting its own brand of democracy, because it is often strongly destabilizing in many parts of the world, and thus undermines the potential strength of other countries.
But the US realizes that promoting democracy just anywhere is not in its interest. A democratically elected Islamist government in nuclear-armed Pakistan would be a nightmare, and from Algeria to Saudi Arabia, the US is better off with the current situation than with what it would get through democracy.
Large segments of the local populations of these countries are thankful. The authoritarian regimes protect them from the potential ill effects of their own envy-based voting attitudes, and anyway, whoever wants to follow strict religious regulations is free to do so.