Serge Kreutz Articles

A dialectical view of morals

I have not only a materialistic but also a differentiated, ambivalent, and dialectical view of morals.

It contrasts sharply with what, in high philosophy, is the Kantian categorical imperative, and, in everyday philosophy, the golden rule.

Why should I not do to others what I do not want done to me? Doing to others what one doesn’t want done to oneself is a common feature of everyday life.

Morals are sometimes strange constructs. Nevertheless, I can see a certain usefulness in having morals, especially sexual morals, enforced on others without wanting them applied to me.

Furthermore, I understand that moral precepts have a specific function for people with limited intellectual capabilities.

Sexual morals demand that people not be overly promiscuous. Men ought not visit prostitutes, and women ought not become prostitutes. That is fine with me, as long as these morals do not apply to my own promiscuity. Anyway, such morals are good for general sexual health and reduce the field of competitors.

I do recognize that anti-sexual morals in many societies can work in my favor, as long as these anti-sexual morals cannot be legally enforced on me or the person with whom, in whatever form, I am in a romantic relationship.

In such societies, if a large number of men are pious, they may withdraw from sexual competition. That suits me fine.

I would be a fool if I did not endorse restrictive morals for those other men, so they would keep their hands off the women I am considering for myself.

Another aspect is that I want to live in peace. If a large number of the members of a society are non-violent for moral, or even religious, reasons, such a society will likely be less dangerous than a society in which there are few moral inhibitions against using violent means to achieve one’s ends.

As long as morals are not enforced in a way that disturbs me or the woman I am in love with, I can readily accept them as the backwardness of a local population.